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INTRODUCTION
The Vietnam War era was without question the most significant period in the history of
relations between the United States and Thailand. After World War II the two countries
developed an extremely close relationship premised on containing the spread of
communism in Southeast Asia. For Thailand, the US represented protection from the
external threat of communist neighbors and the risk that an indigenous communist
insurgency posed. For the US, Thailand represented a bastion of anti-communism in a
region full of political uncertainty. It also represented a valuable Asian ally in the Cold
War, a major "rest and relaxation" (R&R) destination for US servicemen in the region, a
model of economic development in the so-called "Third World," and a strategic base
from which to prosecute both overt and clandestine operations in Indochina. In fact, by
the mid-1960s nearly 80 percent of all American bombing missions flown against North
Vietnam and Laos were launched from air bases in Thailand.1 Moreover, a great number
of US covert operations were also mounted from Thailand, many with direct participation
of Thai forces. In this context, Thailand played an integral role in the shadows of the
Vietnam War.
Little scholarly attention has been paid to US-Thai relations during the Vietnam War era.
There has been even less focus on the covert dimensions of this relationship. The
classification of government documents on both sides is a primary obstacle, as is the fact
that much of the decision-making process in Thai foreign policy during the 1950s and
1960s went undocumented, given Bangkok's predilection for "back-room settings
involving no note-keeping."2 Still, this article attempts to draw from a considerable
volume of recently declassified material from US archives, as well as from an array of
secondary sources. From this documentation it is clear that Thailand was absolutely
critical to US policy in Indochina for nearly 20 years. 
In exchange for its services, there is no question that Thailand benefitted considerably
from American financial largesse during this period. Between 1950 and 1975 Thailand
received from Washington approximately $US 650 million in economic aid, nearly 75
percent of which was directed toward counter-insurgency activities. A further $US 940
million was ear-marked for Thai defence and security, averaging annually over 50 percent
of Bangkok's own expenditures on its armed forces. On top of this, an additional $US 760
million was paid out by Washington in operating costs, including the purchase of military
equipment for Thailand and the payment of Thai troops serving in Vietnam. For the
construction of air bases in Thailand, the US paid out $US 250 million, while American
servicemen stationed in the country and those on leave from Vietnam pumped into the
Thai economy another $US 850 million.3 With over $US 2 billion in total assistance from
Washington just between 1965 and 1975, Thailand was the second largest recipient of
American aid in Southeast Asia next to Vietnam.4 
Thai Foreign Policy
However, these statistics overlook important factors in shaping Thai foreign policy.
Thailand was much more than a simple mercenary. Security from the external threats that
crises in Indochina represented was Thailand's primary motivation in seeking a closer
relationship with the United States, not financial inducement. Most Thais wanted to fight
communism beyond their borders, before it consumed their own country, and therefore
supported American military efforts in the region. In its advocacy of violence, revolution,
and atheism, communism represented the antithesis of Thai cultural traditions.
Communism threatened not only the country, but also the Thai way of life. Moreover, it
was not just communism per se that concerned Thais. Thailand's perceptions were shaped
by the fact that its communist insurgency was sponsored by a familiar and formidable
adversary. Like the rest of Southeast Asia, Thailand lived in the shadow of China.
Ancient Siam had historically been a vassal to the Chinese Emperor, and the threat of
Chinese domination was a very real part of Thai history. A large, closely knit, and
affluent ethnic Chinese community in Thailand only added to the fear that Beijing was
acting out an ancient impulse to dominate the region.5 In this view, although communism
was a dangerous commodity on its own, it was also considered a "banner" behind which
the old Chinese dragon spread its wings. 
Thailand risked a great deal in its association with the United States. Helping Americans
to defend Thailand from invasion or insurgency was one thing, but assisting in wars
elsewhere was quite another. First and foremost, the Thais risked antagonizing their
neighbors, with whom they had an already difficult, violent history. If for any reason the
United States did not succeed in Southeast Asia, Thailand would be left alone,
surrounded by communist states. Secondly, joining the United States in any wars against
communism necessitated considerable American intervention in Thailand. This would
invariably expose traditional Thai culture and society to powerful foreign influences,
which could have serious political implications. The Thais guarded their independence
jealously, and were proud of being the only country in Southeast Asia to have avoided
European colonization during the nineteenth century. Although historically the Thais
occasionally entered into diplomatic pacts with foreign powers, they were extremely
careful to avoid anything more than temporary arrangements. Formal alliances were
infrequent in Thai history, and Thais considered the stationing of even friendly foreign
troops on their soil a serious affront to their independence.6 
However, as the Cold War dawned Thai fears about communist expansion outweighed
any nationalistic sentiment. From Bangkok's point of view it appeared that China was
bent on expansion. Intervention in Korea seemed only the most glaring illustration of
Chinese aggression. Most Thais believed it was the Chinese, and not so much the Soviets,
who were behind supposedly indigenous communist movements throughout Southeast
Asia. American hostility toward Beijing brought the region sharply into focus for
Washington, and almost immediately the US sought to extend the Military Defense
Assistance Program (MDAP, and later MAP) to its Asian clientele. In this setting US-
Thai relations came to the forefront. 
A Convergence of Interests
In the fall of 1950, the Truman administration concluded a series of economic and
military agreements with Bangkok, bringing Thailand into the MAP program. During the
Korean War Thailand contributed troops and much-needed rice shipments to the US-led
multinational United Nations force. Washington reciprocated by helping to secure for
Thailand the first ever World Bank loan to a Southeast Asian nation, and by delivering
unilateral assistance recommended by a number of fact-finding missions.7 Shortly
thereafter, the Truman administration demonstrated its own resolve by dispatching a
Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) to Thailand. Between 1951 and 1953
military aid to Thailand jumped enormously from $US 4.5 million to $US 56 million.8 
Covert operations in Indochina were central to the development of this closer bond
between Washington and Bangkok. Initially, they were predicated on the conflict in Laos,
and its connection to the communist insurgency within Thailand. For the Eisenhower
administration, Laos represented a "proving ground" for US foreign policy in Asia.
Washington's resolve in preventing the spread of communism was on the line, and
following the tenets of the "domino theory," Eisenhower could not allow even tiny Laos
to "fall." It was in Laos, Eisenhower told his successor, John F. Kennedy, that the US
should stand against Asian communism, and there where he feared American military
involvement was inevitable, "with others if possible, alone if necessary."9 
As the buffer against China and Vietnam, historically Laos was of extreme importance to
any Thai regime.10 By the early 1950s this was an even more acute concern, given a
seemingly aggressive communist China and the conflict unfolding in Vietnam. In many
ways Laos was the "dagger" pointed at the heart of Thailand. From Laos, Indochinese
communists could easily make their way across the Mekong River into Northeastern
Thailand. Bangkok's physical and political distance from the region left the people there
isolated from the rest of the nation, something the CIA worried promoted "serious
factional infighting" among Thai parties and politicians. The Northeast was economically
disadvantaged, and it suffered the additional burden of an acutely corrupt local
government and police.11 Moreover, people in the area were considered passive and
apolitical; qualities the CIA believed were conducive to the expansion of communist
ideals. The Northeast was also considered the "wild frontier" of Thailand, rife with gangs,
gamblers, smugglers, and drug addicts. For this and other reasons, the region was a
difficult place in which to instil a strong sense of nationalism.12 The vulnerability of the
Northeast was compounded by the presence of almost 50,000 ethnic Vietnamese, many
with allegiances to Ho Chi Minh. In the mid-1960s, American intelligence analysts
confirmed North Vietnamese and Chinese sponsorship of communists in the Northeast,
estimating that there were some 3,200 guerrillas operating in four battalions made up of
mostly ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese Thai.13 
The fragility of the Northeast and its proximity to the crisis in Laos became a major
concern for both Bangkok and Washington. The communist Pathet Lao were linked to
the North Vietnamese, who in turn received support and direction from Moscow and
Beijing. The situation was worsened by Beijing's creation of the "Thai Nationality
Autonomous Area" in China's Yunnan province in January 1953, where Thai speaking
people resided. Some Thais interpreted the move as a paternalistic reminder of their
ancestral connection with China. Others saw it as Beijing's attempt to assert Chinese
influence in the region. But most Thais took the message as a thinly veiled warning that
Thailand was next on the agenda for communist expansion, especially if it continued its
friendship with the US.14 
Washington responded with increased aid channeled to areas deemed most important to
Thai national security. An example of this was the construction of all-weather roads,
railways, and regional airports to improve Bangkok's access to the Northeast.15 The
"Friendship Highway" between Saraburi and Korat, at a cost of over $US 20 million, was
a notable achievement in this regard. The road also facilitated Thailand's role as a conduit
for covert CIA operations in Indochina. Largely through a dummy business firm, the
"Southeast Asian Supply Company," the CIA (using former OSS agents with service in
Thailand) began training Thai police units in guerrilla warfare by the end of 1951.16 The
Thai National Police (TNP) and Police Aerial Reconnaissance Units (PARU) were
indispensable liaisons between the Americans and Laos, and helped the CIA develop an
anti-communist paramilitary force in Laos. American agents also trained Thai police for
top secret deployment in Laos.17 By 1953 there were some 200 CIA operatives in
Thailand, training the Thais in everything from sabotage operations to parachuting. From
secret bases in northern Thailand, the CIA even planned a coordinated attack by
Kuomintang renegades against the Chinese military in Yunnan province.18 
The appointment of ambassadors also reflected the Eisenhower administration's focus on
counter-insurgency and covert operations. In 1954, William Donovan, the former OSS
chief, was sent to Bangkok to oversee the development of counter-insurgency
capabilities. In addition to a joint US-Thai Psychological Warfare Board, Donovan helped
to establish new police programs, guerrilla training, and the ubiquitous "intelligence
agency" (krom pramuan ratchakan phaen-din).19 When the US inherited the role of
protector in South Vietnam in 1954, Donovan was instrumental in drawing Thailand into
a multi-lateral defence pact, which allowed the Americans access to Thai air bases in the
Northeast. In 1954, Thailand signed the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty,
which gave life to the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, or SEATO; it was squarely
aimed against communist expansion. For the Eisenhower administration, the treaty
created a common front in the region with other allies, and established provisions for
multilateral military forces while avoiding a direct and unilateral US commitment.
Bangkok was chosen as the headquarters for the new organization, and as American
military and economic aid continued to increase, so did the scope of clandestine activities
-- above and beyond the auspices of SEATO. 
In October 1954, Donovan was replaced as ambassador by another former CIA man, John
Peurifoy, who was widely regarded as the "premier anti-communist" in the State
Department. So intimate was Peurifoy and the CIA's relationship with some Thai
politicians that one private researcher hired to evaluate US aid programs commented that
"the American official establishment in Bangkok had climbed into bed" with the Minister
of the Interior, General Phao Siyanon.20 In fact, Thai Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram
was convinced that Washington sent Peurifoy to overthrow him in favor of Phao.21
Thailand's relationship with the United States deepened even more after 1958, when Field
Marshal Sarit Thanarat came to power. By consolidating the Thai military's hold on
power, and co-opting key political rivals into his fold, Sarit ushered in a new era of harsh
but stable rule which allowed for the expansion of US covert operations in Thailand. 
Deepening Involvement: Kennedy and Laos
President Kennedy inherited a policy toward Southeast Asia from Eisenhower, but he did
not share his predecessor's conviction that Laos was so crucial to US national security.
Even with a more concerted response from the US, the situation in Laos seemed
intractable to Kennedy. Countering the extension of the Pathet Lao would involve a
dramatic military commitment, and this could only come from the Americans. Chester
Cooper, a National Security Council (NSC) staff member from 1961 to 1967, later
observed that for the Kennedy administration, "Laos was not all that god-damned
important."22 While he had no desire to look weak by surrendering Laos to communism,
Kennedy also had no intention of being drawn into war, especially over so indefensible a
country. He was optimistic that Laos, together with Cambodia, could form a cordon
sanitaire protecting Thailand and the rest of the region.23 Consequently, Kennedy
developed a conciliatory approach to the Laotian crisis, seeking out international
negotiation along the lines of the 1954 Geneva Accords. However, the Thais saw
negotiations as a sell-out to the communists, convinced that even if a settlement was
achieved in talks, it was untenable in the field. US-Thai relations were dramatically and
adversely affected by Kennedy's decision to pursue negotiations on Laos, and Thai
dissatisfaction became a real problem for Washington. Only after months of difficult
discussions did the Thai government agree to endorse the American position on Laos in
January 1962, but not without grave reservations. 
Yet, while American representatives pursued international negotiations on Laos, the
Kennedy administration simultaneously pursued a "second track" policy with Bangkok
toward the crisis, clearly designed to demonstrate the US commitment to Thailand. In
spring 1961, the new American ambassador, U.A. Johnson, approached Sarit about
placing US troops in Thailand for possible service in Indochina. The Kennedy
administration also continued, and in some cases, extended covert operations throughout
the region, many based in Thailand.24 In April 1961, the CIA began funding "Project
Ekarad," which involved the training of Royal Lao troops and pilots at bases in
Northeastern Thailand under the auspices of American advisers. In addition, the Kennedy
administration enlisted the active support of the Thai Army, which contributed its own
advisers for "special training" exercises with the Lao. Sarit even agreed to implement a
"volunteer program," wherein Thai technicians and pilots were temporarily "discharged"
from the air force, only to quickly reappear as special "consultants" to the Royal Lao
Government -- complete with Lao identification tags. By early 1962, nearly 60 Thais
were employed with Lao units, all on the CIA payroll.25 As for Thai and American
advisers keeping a low profile in Laos, the State Department's Director of Intelligence and
Research (INR), Roger Hilsman, noted that "Aloha shirts, Cadillacs and free spending in
the shops and night clubs of Vientiane . . . are scarcely calculated to minimize the impact
of such a presence."26 
Secret camps in Northeastern Thailand were critical to US support of anti-communists in
Laos. Thai PARU units and Border Police Patrols (BPP) ran surveillance operations, with
more than the occasional rumor surfacing that they had partaken in combat against the
Pathet Lao. In the summer of 1961, the CIA enlisted PARU squads to help "convert"
Hmong tribesmen in Laos and Vietnam through military training in Thailand. Joint covert
operations were in fact formalized with the establishment of the "Joint Liaison
Detachment" (JLD) in late 1962. Through this body the CIA orchestrated much of the
training and logistics required for clandestine activities in Laos with the full support of
Thai military authorities. The Thai Army even set up a special unit, HQ 333, to help
coordinate covert operations, enlisting 50 special operations personnel.27 
Still, unhappy with international negotiations on Laos, the Thais pressed for a unilateral
security guarantee from Washington, something that no American president was prepared
to offer for fear of over-extending US obligations in Southeast Asia. For the Thais,
SEATO was little more than a paper tiger. The Thai leadership considered it an
ineffective deterrent to communist expansion. To prevent the deterioration of relations
with the Thais, the Kennedy administration, therefore, considered alternatives to
SEATO.28 After much deliberation, in March 1962 the State Department publicly issued
a joint communiqué during a visit to Washington by Thai Foreign Minister Thanat
Khoman. Dubbed the "Rusk-Thanat Agreement," the communiqué reaffirmed American
determination to maintain "the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to the
national interest of the United States and to world peace." It also spoke about
Washington's "firm intention" to aid Thailand in resisting communism. Most importantly,
the agreement specified that the US commitment to Thailand was not exclusively based
on SEATO.29 It remained unclear, however, exactly how far the Americans would go in
the defence of Thailand, and how the agreement would be interpreted in both Bangkok
and Washington. 
The Rusk-Thanat Agreement soon faced its first challenge in May 1962, when Pathet
Lao forces scored a huge tactical victory by taking the town of Nam Tha in Northwestern
Laos. Fearing that this was the precursor to a communist invasion of Thailand, Sarit
deployed several thousand troops along the Mekong River. The resulting stand-off was
very tense, especially given Sarit's threat to occupy the Lao side of the river if need be. In
Washington, Kennedy responded decisively to the possibility of a collision between Thai
and Pathet Lao forces. He prepared for US intervention along the Thai-Lao frontier,
ostensibly to prevent a communist incursion into Thailand. Within hours a battle group
was assembled. After considering a number of options, including shoring up Lao anti-
communists with US forces and bombing Pathet Lao strongholds, Kennedy decided to
send troops into Thailand. 
The Kennedy administration wanted troops in Thailand as a warning to the Pathet Lao
and their backers in Beijing and Hanoi, and the president knew the deployment could be a
valuable bargaining chip at negotiations on Laos in Geneva.30 Sending the troops was
also a clear demonstration of how important Thailand was to the US, and of Kennedy's
resolve to intervene militarily against communist expansion in the region. On 18 May
1962, just over 6,500 US Marines from the transport Valley Forge landed in Thailand. It
was the first overt deployment of American combat soldiers in Southeast Asia since
World War Two, and it marked the first time foreign combat troops entered Thailand for
a purpose other than invasion or occupation.31 
US military operations in Thailand during the 1962 deployment laid much of the
groundwork for American and Thai involvement in Vietnam. The mechanism for both
overt and covert US-Thai cooperation was strengthened with the replacement of MAAG
Thailand by a new command structure; the Military Assistance Command Thailand, or
MACTHAI. The Marine task force in Thailand was directed by OPLAN 32-59, which
was designed to hold the border, maintain a ceasefire, and integrate Thai and American
forces. Washington also had other objectives in deploying the troops. Developing better
counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast was a top priority of OPLAN 32-59.
Accordingly, the US military sent 84 instructors, along with 156 members of the Special
Forces, from Okinawa to Thailand. Training focused on Thai units capable of extended
action in the Northeast and Laos, and included guerrilla and counter-insurgency
operations, aerial raids, and demolition.32 Thai units even engaged the Pathet Lao near
Muong Soui, Laos, in what the US Embassy in Bangkok referred to as "covert
harassment."33 American technicians and engineers also arrived to bring Thai air bases to
full capacity in the event that large-scale, offensive operations were required against
either Laos or North Vietnam.34 The augmentation of air bases and landing strips
throughout Thailand was in fact the real success of the deployment. Korat quickly became
an important nerve centre and "rumble seat" for secret air strikes against Laos and North
Vietnam. Takhli, code-named "Pepper Grinder," became one of the most vital and
secretive bases for reconnaissance as the home for U-2 and SR-71 missions, as well as
regular CIA funded Air America transports.35 By the end of 1962, Thai-base aircraft
regularly ran reconnaissance missions over Laos, as well as air strikes against Pathet Lao
and North Vietnamese positions near the Cambodian border. 
Most observers in both Washington and Bangkok expected the American troops in
Thailand to remain indefinitely. In fact, the notion of maintaining US forces in Thailand
on a permanent basis received serious attention in Washington.36 However, after signing
the final declaration on Laos in Geneva on 28 July 1962, Kennedy made the decision to
withdraw US forces from Thailand. Wary of extended military commitments, and
relieved by the negotiated settlement, Kennedy removed the task force quickly.37 The
Thai government was very upset. Although Kennedy apologized personally to Sarit,
reassuring him that Congressional pressure in the US was the reason for the quick
departure, both Sarit and Thanat Khoman resented the decision, and began to increase
their criticisms of American foreign policy in Asia. 
In the aftermath of the Geneva settlement and the abrupt withdrawal of US troops, Thai
confidence in Washington reached a low ebb. The situation in Laos looked bleak, with
communist advances throughout the country. In September 1962, State Department
intelligence estimated that between 7,000 and 9,000 North Vietnamese combat forces
were in Laos, notwithstanding denials from Hanoi. The Kennedy administration
anticipated that Hanoi's strategy was to secretly consolidate its control of Laotian
provinces adjacent to the Vietnamese border. Washington also knew that Laos was being
used as a conduit by North Vietnam to infiltrate the South through the ubiquitous "Ho Chi
Minh Trail." In response, the Kennedy administration re-evaluated its position on US
troops in Thailand. A strong military presence in Thailand would reassure Bangkok of
Kennedy's commitment, and send a strong message to Hanoi and Beijing. So, just as the
troops sent during the crisis in May left Thailand, the Kennedy administration began to
explore avenues to send them back in. Kennedy saw this as a necessary step not so much
to save Laos, or even to protect Thailand, but rather to prepare for expanded military
involvement in South Vietnam if necessary.38 
Toward Vietnam
During much of 1963 the Kennedy administration tried to repair the damage the Geneva
Conference on Laos had caused to Thai confidence, but only fate's intervention at the end
of the year helped improve matters. Within two weeks of Kennedy's assassination Thai
Prime Minister Sarit died, leaving a void in Thai politics. The new prime minister,
Thanom Kittachakorn, did not share his predecessor's reservations over American
commitment to Southeast Asia. In March 1964, Thanom demonstrated his trust by
formally permitting US bombing of Vietcong sanctuaries and supply routes in Laos with
aircraft from Thai bases. He even discussed supporting systematic American air strikes
against North Vietnam.39 Thanom also worked carefully to secure political support for an
expanded American military presence in Thailand. Most significantly, shortly after the
Gulf of Tonkin incident in August, Thanom lifted all restrictions on US combat sorties
originating in Thailand, subject only to "plausible denial" of Thai connivance. This
crucial decision reversed Bangkok's long-standing insistence that it be informed of every
mission. It reflected Thanom's commitment to the US, and gave Washington the leeway it
needed to expand both covert and overt operations in Indochina. 
Early in 1964, the new US ambassador in Bangkok, Graham Martin, approached the
Thais about expanding the United States Air Force (USAF) F-100 detachment nearby
Korat. He also felt them out about stationing American ground troops near the Laotian
border. Contingency plans attached to so-called Project 22 were drawn up in 1965,
anticipating joint US-Thai occupation of key spots along the Mekong River, and the
seizure of cities, airfields and bridgeheads in Laos. Virtually all Thai combat forces
figured in the calculations, along with one division and two brigades of American troops
under field command of US officers. Defense Department analysts considered Project 22
of "special political significance" for the Thais, because it at least appeared quite bilateral
in character even if in fact the US was essentially in charge.40 
Thanom responded to the overtures by authorizing a CIA training detachment based at
Udon Thani (Udorn) under the code name, "Project Waterpump."41 This was designed to
build up Lao and Thai air capabilities through combat experience. Thai pilots flew many
reconnaissance and even bombing missions over Pathet Lao territory, all in unmarked
planes and without identification.42 Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman followed this
up by offering the open-ended service of Thai Special Forces Ranger units in Laos.43 In
July 1964, Lao anti-communist forces attacked Pathet Lao positions near Muong Soui in
operation "Triangle," involving Air America transport, with cover provided by USAF and
Thai strike forces.44 In October, "Yankee Team" reconnaissance missions over Laos were
increased, escorted by Thai and American fighters based in the Northeast.45 Supposedly
acting in self-defence while flying search and rescue, US T-28s, flown by Thai and Lao
pilots, sometimes engaged communist positions targeted by the CIA. On one occasion,
Thai pilots flying with Royal Lao markings attacked a Pathet Lao headquarters near
Khang Khay without American authorization, damaging the Chinese economic mission.46
At a media briefing in Washington following the incident, Assistant Secretary of Defense
William Bundy confirmed that the pilots were Lao and Thai, adding "I'd rather not see
that in print, but there are some Thai who are flying."47 The "secret war" in Laos thus
developed as a vital appendage of the growing conflict in Vietnam, drawing Thai and
American interests ever closer. By early 1965, US aircraft based in Thailand were also
critical to US bombing in Vietnam. The majority of planes for Operation FLAMING
DART and ROLLING THUNDER were launched from Thai bases. In fact, over half of
the all such missions during 1965 originated in Thailand.48 
Many Thais welcomed an expanded American military role in Vietnam, relieved that
Washington was acting in earnest against the spread of communism.49 However, in
solidly tying itself to the US and to the anti-communist struggle in Vietnam, Thailand
risked a great deal. Unless the Americans were completely successful in defending South
Vietnam, Thailand could find itself in a very delicate position. The Thais believed that an
American withdrawal, or even a neutralist settlement in South Vietnam, would likely
result in an eventual victory for the communists. Such an outcome would inevitably result
in the fall of Laos and Cambodia to communism, and perhaps Burma as well, leaving
Thailand totally isolated. Despite all the money and aid the US could lavish on Thailand,
the Americans might one day go home, leaving the Thais surrounded by potentially
hostile neighbors.50 Consequently, being inconspicuous in its support of the US became
an obsession in Bangkok that frequently took on comic proportions. 
Despite vigorous denials by Ambassador Martin and the Thai Government, by 1966 it
was common knowledge that US planes based in Thailand were being used against North
Vietnam. Martin characterized his own efforts to conceal the fact as "a useful facade, but
an absolutely necessary concession to Thai sovereignty."51 The American public affairs
officer in Bangkok, John R. O'Brien, described Thai efforts to limit press coverage of air
bases "as elaborate as the Japanese tea ceremony."52 By early 1966, over 200 American
combat aircraft were based on Thai soil, with a complement of over 9,000 USAF
personnel. By the end of the year, there were over 400 planes and nearly 25,000 men. The
capstone of this rapid build-up was the construction of the supposedly secret B-52 air
base at Utapao, near Sattahip, south of Bangkok. Completed in spring 1966, it was the
sixth base built by the US military in Thailand since 1960. It was also the most important
and expensive. Construction of the base cost nearly $US 40 million, and required the
labour of 25,000 American servicemen and 2,000 Thais. Utapao was a self-sustaining
community, complete with night-clubs staffed by local Thais. A cluster of shanty towns
sprang up around the base, offering servicemen everything from souvenirs to
prostitutes.53 For Washington the deployment of B-52s in Thailand meant a savings of
$US 8,000 per round trip for each plane, compared to costs for a round trip from Guam,
nearly 2,000 miles away. Utapao quickly became the work-horse of US air bases in
Thailand, responsible for the majority of the 1,500 weekly bombing runs flown between
December 1965 and November 1968. Considering that Thai-based US aircraft accounted
for nearly 80 percent of all ordnance dropped on North Vietnam and Laos during this
period, Utapao's military importance is very clear.54 
The lack of secrecy surrounding Utapao's construction marked a turning point for
Thanom's government. Bangkok purposely did little to deny the existence of the base,
effectively making Utapao an open symbol of Thailand's commitment. Thailand was now
a self-acknowledged partner in the US fight against North Vietnam, with all the risks
inherent in such a stance. This was well-received by the Johnson administration, which
wanted as many foreign flags as possible to fly in Vietnam, particularly those of Asian
allies, in order to avoid the perception that this was an exclusively American or "white
man's" war.55 While officials in the Johnson administration denied it, Bangkok's more
open commitment to the US war effort was likely motivated by promises of more
assistance. No official agreements were signed to this effect, but there is little question
that the Thai granting of bases and other rights was on a quid pro quo basis.56 
Any reservations the Thai leadership might have had about the expanded US presence
were evidently overcome. In January 1966, Thanat Khoman made the first public
government statement on the bases in an interview with Newsweek magazine.
Acknowledging that Thailand's role in Vietnam had become "more or less an open
secret," Thanat maintained that the United States did not in fact have bases in Thailand.
Rather, he insisted that Thailand was allowing the US to "make use of certain military
installations and facilities because we are partners in SEATO's collective defense."
Thanat pointed out that the establishment of American bases in Thailand required a
formal alliance, and that no such bilateral agreement existed.57 Later in the year, Thanat
conceded to the Washington Post that Thailand did not need 11,000 foot runways in the
Northeast just for its own air force, effectively admitting to Thai involvement with
American air operations in Vietnam.58 
Bangkok continued support for the US when in early 1966 Prime Minister Thanom
announced that Thailand could send its own troop contingent to South Vietnam. So
popular was the idea with the Thai public that within a few months nearly 5,000 men
volunteered in Bangkok alone.59 After months of negotiations with American
representatives, in October 1967 the Thai government pledged an additional 10,000-man
force. Washington agreed to cover all of the contingent's training and supplies. More
importantly, Washington agreed to increase MAP funding for 1968 from $US 60 million
to $US 75 million, and to maintain that level for 1969. Unquestionably, economic factors
were part of the Thai decision-making process. The Thanom regime clearly anticipated
that sending Thai troops would produce even more military and economic largesse from
Washington. But money alone was not the only factor concerning Thailand. Security and
survival in the face of communist expansion greatly outweighed any mercenary
tendencies the Thais may have had. Fighting in Vietnam was far better than waiting to
fight on Thai soil. By 1971, almost 11,000 Thais were serving in Vietnam, representing
fully 15 percent of the Thai Armed Forces. Many more, perhaps as many as 22,000,
served as "irregulars" in Laos. Official statistics claimed 350 dead with over 1,000
wounded -- next to South Korea, the highest losses of any foreign troops assisting the
Americans.60 
Graham Martin understood the Thai's bottom line, and had little problem coming to terms
with what some historians see as a kind of extortion, or even prostitution.61 Martin
argued that the Thai contribution to American operations in Indochina was invaluable.
Thai air bases were the "pivotal factor" in the success of bombing missions, and the Thais
also figured heavily in "hard-nose" operations in Laos, giving logistical support and even
men to "a long list of extraordinary, sensitive activities."62 Thus, they deserved
favourable treatment, and that meant more money. Martin told Washington that "Thailand
is, in effect, presently at war as an ally of the United States and that as the pace of that
war increases, the risks to Thailand become greater."63 
The Danger Within: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Thailand
One of the risks was a growing communist insurgency in Northeast Thailand. Guerrillas
there were inextricably linked the Pathet Lao, and in turn to North Vietnam. As
Bangkok's involvement in the war against Hanoi increased, so did communist attention
on Thailand's frontier. Since 1963 the US Embassy's "Internal Security Program" (ISP)
had been the basis of counter-insurgency operations in Thailand. American military
assistance, the strengthening of police and border patrol units, and a "civic action" project
designed to improve living conditions in the Northeast were the key components. Road
construction and enhanced communications through to the Laotian border were top
priorities, and became the personal responsibility of deputy mission chief, Alfred
Puhan.64 The US Information Service (USIS) was given the task of developing a sense of
"national cohesion" through the promotion of the Thai government in areas where
Bangkok was traditionally viewed with suspicion. The ISP also planned for the training
and improved efficiency of government officials in the provinces, as well as the extension
of capital for economic growth and social programs.65 
The US Military Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) developed a separate counter-
insurgency program for Thailand in 1963, allotting $US 700 million over six years. While
admitting that the situation in Thailand was not as urgent as it was in South Vietnam,
CINCPAC stressed the need to "beat the communists to the punch." It was anticipated
that, left unchecked, the communist insurgency in Thailand would become a serious
problem within a few years. The goal, therefore, was to build up the Thais' capacity to
fight a guerrilla conflict in the Northeast.66 A March 1963 CIA report underscored the
seriousness of the communist insurgency, warning that there was "increasing evidence to
suggest that Thailand is in the classic phase one of insurgency development," with a
"discernible increase in subversive activities . . . aided and abetted by the Pathet Lao and
other hostile elements in Laos."67 Activity in the south along the Malaysian frontier was
also noted, with suggestions that Muslim separatists, "Chinese terrorists," and Indonesian
communists were aiding insurgents. The sizeable Vietnamese population in Thailand
warranted special attention, given their relative isolation and proximity to Laos, as well as
ties to such hill tribes as the Akha and Lahu. Communists in Thailand received aid and
training through Laos from North Vietnam and the PRC, with an estimated 3,000 of them
either residing in Laotian camps or serving with the Pathet Lao. The CIA's report warned
that "all conditions for rapid development of a subversive mechanism" were present in
Thailand and that without considerable efforts by the Thais and US, "the situation will
continue to deteriorate to the point of insurgency."68 
Counter-insurgency efforts confronted a number of groups in Thailand. In 1961, the
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) formally proclaimed an armed struggle, and
followed that up with establishment of four regional branches. In March 1962, just after
the announcement of the Rusk-Thanat agreement, another communist group, the Voice of
the People of Thailand (VOPT), began radio broadcasts from a secret location in Laos,
strengthening Bangkok's conviction that the insurgent threat was external rather than
indigenous in origin.69 In December, another clandestine radio transmitter, this time in
Northeastern Thailand, proclaimed the "Thailand Independence Movement" (TIM),
whose manifesto was published five days later by the New China News Agency.70 On 23
January 1965, the "Patriotic Front of Thailand" (PFT) was announced by the VOPT.
Although the relationship between these groups was not fully known, the presumption in
Bangkok was that they represented a multi-pronged attack by foreign communist
powers.71 
By the mid 1960s this seeming proliferation of communist groups caught Bangkok off
guard, since the Thais had grown somewhat complacent with their counter-insurgency
efforts in the Northeast. The few communist attacks that had occurred were attributed to
guerrillas from Laos, and officials in Bangkok doubted that groups like CPT had the
organizational capabilities to warrant Beijing's direct attention. Even more disturbing was
the fact that the radio transmissions coincided with a rash of assassinations in remote
areas of Nakhon Phanom province. This alarmed local officials and embarrassed counter-
insurgency efforts. But more than anything, Bangkok was troubled by evidence of the
PRC's backing for the insurgency.72 On 31 July 1964, the People's Daily in Beijing
published an article by two Thai dissidents. Then, in October 1964, CPT representatives
addressed the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the occasion of
China's National Day. In January 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi told the
French Ambassador in Beijing that "within a year, we will have a war going in Thailand."
The focus would be on the Northeast, and was designed to "shake US faith in the Thai
stability."73 Late in 1965, former Thai prime minister and exiled leftist Pridi Phanomyong
re-emerged in Beijing at a well-publicized meeting with Mao Zedong. Thai leaders feared
that Pridi was still popular in Thailand, and that the Chinese would use him to lead the
insurgency. Other senior Chinese officials, such as Liao Cheng-chih, Chairman of the
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, added to Bangkok's anxiety by voicing support
for the insurgency. A key person in directing communist activities abroad, Liao
proclaimed that Beijing had an "unshirkable obligation" (sic) to support "the struggles of
the people" of Thailand. The news that the PRC was bank-rolling large purchases of Thai
currency in Hong Kong made many in Thailand fear the worst.74 
By 1966, both Bangkok and Washington perceived that a major insurgency was
underway, and that it had direction and support from Beijing. A CIA report in September
1965 pointed out that the Chinese were actively infiltrating hill tribes in Laos and
Thailand, as well as sponsoring the CPT. There was even a suspected Chinese connection
to the Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand and Malaysia.75 The CIA concluded that
the communists in Thailand posed a real, immediate, and growing threat, despite their
relatively low numbers.76 Not surprisingly, the Thai government adopted severe domestic
measures to curb dissent. By the end of the year, Bangkok and Washington also placed a
renewed emphasis on counter-insurgency. In December 1965, the Thai government, with
US assistance, created the "Communist Suppression Operations Command" (CSOC),
which was designed to oversee the frequently unconnected activities of the BPP, TNP and
PARU. CSOC immediately requested training and technical support from US Special
Forces, and in order to provide this the Joint Chiefs of Staff implemented a separate
program for Thailand given constraints on operations in Vietnam.77 
Despite CIA contentions that the communists in the Northeast were "generally
ineffective," their connection to Beijing was a source of anxiety. In February 1966,
Minister of the Interior Praphas Charusthian urgently requested advance shipment of
helicopters scheduled for delivery in 1967. He argued that communist activity in the
Northeast was on the upswing, and that helicopters would give a boost to reconnaissance
and search-and-destroy operations. Ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman agreed, and
after a meeting with Thai officials later that month he advised Washington that $US 71
million in 1967 MAP funding for Thailand was needed to provide even more helicopters
than already authorized.78 Graham Martin also stressed the urgency of the situation in the
Northeast. He warned the State Department that the Northeast was "too much like
Vietnam" for comfort, and that immediate, concerted efforts were needed to prevent this
vulnerable region of Thailand from suffering the same fate as South Vietnam.79 
Bangkok responded to the expedited funding by agreeing to the deployment of the US
606th Air Commandos squadron, designed to further train the Thai forces in counter-
insurgency operations. Three Thai Special Forces detachments were paired with a 128-
man team from the US 1st Special Forces Group based in Okinawa. By the fall six joint
squads were in place, most of them in the Pitsanulok area. They immediately saw action
against insurgents in both the Northeast and South.80 In early May, Operation BUNNAM
commenced, with over 1,200 air sorties being launched in a one week period against
communist positions in Indochina, while joint US and Thai Special Forces conducted 30-
day "suppression activities" in remote, undisclosed locations.81 Martin reported that
evidence from the operations confirmed not only Laotian but also Cambodian aid to Thai
communists in the Northeast.82 
Though unable to offer conclusive proof, the Thais maintained that PRC agents were
active in the area running guns and other supplies. Waiting for incontrovertible evidence
of the Chinese role was, Thanom said, "no different from waiting for a conflagration to
spread and reach our house."83 Making matters worse, VOPT broadcasts in early 1966
called for a "people's war" against US imperialism in Thailand, and claimed that
Communist China would soon help "save" Thailand from the Americans.84 In fact, a
USIS field report linked Beijing to virtually all insurgents in the Northeast: the CPT and
TIM, as well as lesser groups, such as the Patriotic Teacher's Group, the Thai Monk's
Group, and the Federation of Patriotic Workers. The CIA obtained further proof of the
Chinese connection to the insurgency in October 1966 after captured communists were
found carrying Chinese weapons and documents, indicating that they had been trained in
Laos, North Vietnam, and Communist China.85 However, it may be that this information
was not passed on to Bangkok. As one CIA report noted, absolute proof linking Beijing to
the insurgency would only give the Thais added ammunition in demanding more aid from
Washington.86 Clearly, the State Department did not agree with such an assessment.
Dean Rusk repeatedly drew attention to Chinese involvement in his public statements,
announcing on a NBC Today program in January 1967 that a training camp for Thai
guerrillas had been confirmed in North Vietnam, and telling USIA reporters in October
that both North Vietnamese and Chinese regulars were assisting insurgents in Thailand.87
Despite the different approaches by the CIA and the State Department, it was increasingly
clear to Washington and Bangkok that Beijing was taking a more active role in the
training and organization of the cadres. 
In April 1968, communist guerrillas overran a BPP centre at Ban Huai Khu in Chiang
Changwat, with only two of the 17 defenders surviving.88 During that spring Thai troops
suffered a relatively high number of casualties, victims of well-executed ambushes
throughout the region. Then, in July, a small band of guerrillas penetrated Udorn air base,
destroying several US C-141 and F-4D aircraft as well as HU-43 helicopters. It was the
first serious attack against US forces in Thailand. Five Americans and Thais were
wounded in the incident, while four of the invaders were killed, including a North
Vietnamese regular army officer.89 A senior American official in Thailand with prior
service in South Vietnam noted afterwards that "things look far worse here today than
they did in Saigon in 1960."90 Thanom suggested that communist numbers were on the
rise, totalling 3,000 in the Northeast alone. Some, he claimed, were Chinese and
Vietnamese agents.91 In November 1968, American intelligence services estimated that
just slightly over 2,000 communist insurgents were present in the whole country, but
agreed that the numbers were growing.92 Even US Ambassador Leonard Unger, who took
over for Martin in Bangkok in spring 1968, was apprehensive that expanded covert
operations in Laos had provoked the communists into stepping up infiltration of the
Northeast, which could have serious repercussions for Thanom's stability.93 
Following these attacks further counter-insurgency measures and covert activities were
adopted. In July 1968, three full complements of Thai troops were sent to Laos to conduct
special operations. Under special project "Folder Mark," US Special Forces designed
long-range reconnaissance missions for the Thai Army, as well as BPP and PARU
units.94 The "College Eye Task Force" ran advanced radar relay flights over the Gulf of
Tonkin and Laos, while "Igloo White Task Force" ran in-country electronic sensor
operations throughout the Northeast.95 American-led psychological operations, requested
by the Thai government, expanded dramatically. By early 1968 USIA Thailand had a staff
of 52 running projects in 13 districts. Its budget for that year topped $US 15.5 million,
making it the third largest USIA field bureau in the world after South Vietnam and
Japan.96 Moreover, Thai Special Forces saw expanded field service in both Vietnam and
Laos.97 In fact, it was revealed during 1969 Senate hearings on US military activities in
Indochina that Thais, dressed as Lao and Hmong tribesmen, made up a good portion of
l'armée clandestine operating throughout Laos. It is estimated that as many as 21,400
Thais served in that country by 1973.98 Not revealed was the fact that the Thai Special
Forces were, like American soldiers in Vietnam, occasionally prone to savage excess. In
February 1968, the US Embassy reported to Washington that Thai Special Forces had
massacred 72 Hmong villagers at Chong Pai village in the Northeast on 16 October 1967.
No formal investigation was ever held, and Bangkok dismissed the episode as communist
propaganda.99 
China's Backing
Despite fear about increased communist activity in the Northeast, the PRC actually
refrained from pushing its intrusion in Thailand too far. Its material support for Thai
communists was limited, and political backing for the insurgency was kept at the party
level, rarely coming from the Beijing government itself. Even in their rhetoric the
Chinese were noticeably reserved toward Thailand. There was little criticism of the Thai
king or the Buddhist faith. Instead, the focus was almost exclusively on regional and
ethnic differences within the country, and on Bangkok's cosy relationship with the US.
All in all, Beijing approached the situation in Thailand with extreme caution.100 The
Chinese seem to have realized that, unlike Vietnam, Thailand could serve as a secure base
for long-term US operations in the region. Beijing apparently worried that the Americans
would entrench themselves in Thailand once they were beaten in Vietnam. In such
circumstances, China would face a permanent and threatening US presence along its
frontier.101 
Perhaps Beijing also realized that the CPT lacked adequate leadership and substantial
issues, and that its approach was "too Chinese" to appeal to most Thais.102 In any event,
Chinese support of insurgents in Thailand appears to have been an exercise in propaganda
and limited military pressure, and not the prelude to more far-reaching intervention aimed
at toppling the government in Bangkok. There were in fact no confirmed communist
attacks on US or Thai military installations in 1966, only a few assassinations of local
Thai leaders, and occasional skirmishes in five Northeastern regions.103 Again, during
1967 no military installations came under attack, although the number of deaths linked to
the insurgency substantially increased. There were 138 people in the Northeast confirmed
killed by guerrillas, including 78 government officials. American intelligence estimates in
1967 put the number of insurgents in the whole country at only 2,500 and growing, with
1,500 of those in the North.104 It is also clear that the upswing in insurgent activity was
primarily a response to the growing influence of the United States in Thailand and its
increased efforts in Vietnam, rather than a reflection of widespread domestic
dissatisfaction in Thailand itself. Economic growth, although uneven, continued virtually
unabated. Reverence for the Thai monarchy and Buddhism remained a profoundly
important aspect of Thai society, reinforcing a basic conservatism throughout most of the
country that contributed to the stability of the government.105 
Cambodia
While issues relating to Laos, Vietnam, and counter-insurgency dominated the US-Thai
relationship, there were yet other dimensions to Thailand's role in covert operations.
Much to Washington's dismay, Bangkok supported the Khmer Serei rebels in Cambodia,
who opposed the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk.106 The enmity between
Thailand and Cambodia dated back centuries, but flared up during the 1950s against the
backdrop of rising conflict in Laos and Vietnam. In January 1959, diplomatic relations
between Bangkok and Phnom Penh were suspended. The Sarit regime alleged that
Cambodia harbored communist insurgents from Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, and that its
recognition of the PRC in July 1958 effectively made Sihanouk a communist puppet.
Cambodia in turn accused the Thais of numerous border violations, and even attempts to
assassinate the royal family.107 Washington was dragged into the vortex. American aid to
Thailand did not go unnoticed by Cambodians, and Washington was quickly linked to
what they saw as Thai aggression and irredentism. 
Sihanouk's war of words with Thailand over these issues became a constant feature of
Cambodian foreign policy, making it very difficult for Washington to deal with Phnom
Penh. In fact, Sihanouk seemed to go out of his way to antagonize Thailand and the US.
In January 1964, he ordered the public execution of Khmer Serei rebels linked to his old
adversary, Son Ngoc Thanh, whom the Thais had supported.108 On the occasion of Sarit's
death in December 1963, Sihanouk publicly vented his anger against the Thais. Speaking
on Radio Phnom Penh, he rejoiced in the Thai leader's passing, and called upon
Cambodians to pray for Thanat Khoman's death too, promising a three day holiday if he
did.109 Sihanouk also welcomed the deaths of Ngo Dinh Diem and John Kennedy,
referring to the late president as the "great boss," and noting that he, Sarit, and Diem
would "all meet in hell."110 When the State Department protested, Sihanouk recalled the
entire Cambodian mission from Washington and threatened to break off diplomatic
relations completely. 
The Thais did not help matters either. Thanom continued to support the Khmer Serei
despite pleas from Washington to stop. Getting the Thais to moderate their Cambodian
policy was a major goal for Washington, which saw a solid, non-communist government
in Phnom Penh as essential for regional stability. With that in mind, successive US
ambassadors were instructed to do all they could to secure Bangkok's cooperation.
President Johnson considered improving the relationship between Thailand and Sihanouk
a top priority in Asia, commenting to his advisers, "I just don't understand why we can't
get along with that little Prince . . .. He runs a wonderful country; he's a great little
man."111 
Fear of rising Chinese influence in Cambodia added to Thailand's hatred of Sihanouk. In
his meeting with the commander of US forces in Vietnam, General William
Westmoreland, in October 1968, Minister of the Interior Praphas stated that Beijing's
influence in the Khmer kingdom was rapidly increasing, and that the Chinese were using
the country as a conduit for weapons into South Vietnam. He claimed that Sihanouk even
had an agreement with the PRC to permit the transportation of weapons across
Cambodian territory into South Vietnam. Noting that there were over 10,000 members of
the Khmer Serei along the Thai-Cambodian frontier, poised for action against Sihanouk,
Praphas argued that it was "timely to give the group encouragement and support."
Anxious to avoid more complications in dealing with Phnom Penh, Westmoreland told
Praphas that the US did not condone Thai support of the Khmer Serei, suggesting that
numerous rebel raids against Cambodian government positions just inside the border
were not in Washington's, or Bangkok's, best interests.112 
The issue of Cambodia was much more than a minor irritant in US-Thai relations.
Thailand saw Cambodia as the US did Cuba because of its proximity and strategic
sensitivity. The Thai leadership expected Washington to understand that. Bangkok was
willing to give the Americans essentially all that they wanted, but being told how to deal
with Sihanouk was too much to stomach. Not only was Cambodia a long-time enemy, but
the country represented another Laos for the Thais. A weak, erratic government in Phnom
Penh ignored the growing strength of communists within, while openly courting the favor
of international communist powers under a thin veil of neutrality. What made matters
even worse was that, unlike Laos, the Thais did not have the same cultural or "family"
connections to Cambodians. Whereas in the Laotian crisis Thailand played a major and
potentially positive role, in Cambodia it served only as the object of Sihanouk's political
diatribes, and an external target to distract attention away from internal weaknesses.113 
Burma
Thailand's covert activities also extended to the "Golden Triangle" region overlapping the
borders of Thailand, Laos, and Burma. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Kuomintang
(KMT) irregulars operating in northern Thailand periodically engaged both Burmese and
communist Chinese forces.114 America feared that the Thais knew of and condoned KMT
actions. Taiwanese officials even requested Thai assistance in aiding the irregulars.
Burmese authorities already distrusted and resented the Thais for their inaction against
the Shan, Karen, and other rebellious ethnic minorities seeking sanctuary in Thailand
from their intermittent civil war with Rangoon.115 Such Thai complicity with the KMT
further threatened regional stability, and risked a serious escalation of tensions with the
PRC in Burma and in Laos. By 1963, there was a perpetual state of confusion inside the
"Golden Triangle," complete with periodic clashes between combinations of tribal groups
and the KMT, as well as Thai and Burmese soldiers. 
Washington feared Burma's drift toward the PRC and thus did not want to appear in
anyway connected to Thai policy toward Rangoon. In fact, official US policy was
sympathetic to the Burmese situation, and the Embassy in Bangkok was directed to
persuade the Thais not to intervene. From an American perspective, better Thai-Burmese
relations would not only stabilize the volatile tri-border area, but also possibly woo the
Burmese away from Beijing. The Thais did not deny that tribal insurgents received
supplies in Thailand. The government simply maintained that such support came from
private, not official, sources. The problem was with the Burmese, and their inability to
prevent border crossings in the first place. With a sizeable Shan and Karen population in
the remote northwest of Thailand, Bangkok was cautious. It could not afford to alienate
the hill tribes. They were already susceptible to communist infiltration from Laos, and
military action against them in Burma might ignite a rebellion in Thailand as well.
Therefore, even though the Thais realized that better relations with Rangoon would be in
their best interest, they could not appear too committed to the process. As a result, the
turmoil continued, accentuated by occasional clashes and sabre-rattling on both sides of
the border.116 
Problems in the Golden Triangle were complicated by the struggle for control of the
lucrative opium trade. This "Opium War" resulted in frequently serious fighting along the
Thai-Burmese-Lao corridor among the hills tribes and KMT. Making matters worse was
the fact that many prominent Thai leaders were well-connected to the drug trade. Sarit
had been deeply involved, and although Thanom was more discreet, the opium trade still
reached all the way to the prime minister's office. Praphas was particularly important to
the trade in his role as "an adept manager of an illicit economy that ranged from opium to
arms trading."117 To prevent disclosure of the Thai leadership's links to the drug trade,
Bangkok ordered the Thai Army to keep a close eye on KMT villages, while at the same
time remaining in a position to protect them and secure a cut of the profits from the
trafficking. Purportedly in defence of their border, in 1966 the Thai Army occupied
villages adjacent to the Shan states.118 But the Army caused more problems, occupying
Hmong villages in Chiangrai province and extorting opium profits from them too. In May
1967, after several such incidents, the Hmong retaliated, attacking Thai troops northeast
of Nan. The Thais responded with force, razing villages and, under the direction of
CSOC, even napalming Hmong positions.119 
Congress and Questions
Just as Bangkok's activities in Burma and Cambodia could not escape American
attention, Congressional scrutiny on the covert dimensions of US-Thai relations was a
constant factor throughout the Vietnam War era. In 1966 and 1967, hearings by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee probed the exact nature of American commitments
to Thailand, focusing on what Senator William Fulbright (D-Arkansas) called a
suspiciously close relationship.120 From the Thai perspective, Congressional inquiries
cast doubt on the two countries' friendship, renewing Bangkok's concerns about a US
withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Faced with such scrutiny and a growing anti-war
movement in the US, by the end of 1968 Thailand began to re-evaluate its relationship
with Washington. Some observers in Washington considered the change in Thailand to be
disloyal; as if the Thais were classic fair-weather friends abandoning the US during a
difficult time. Many in Washington took changes in Thai attitudes to be typical "Siamese
talk," giving the appearance of disillusionment only to elicit more aid.121 While the latter
tactic had definitely not been uncommon in US-Thai relations, by the end of 1968 it was a
thing of the past. Many Thais were beginning to realize that the US was likely going to
pull-out of Southeast Asia, no matter what Americans said to the contrary, and the
communists were going to win. A negotiated settlement in Vietnam would only delay the
inevitable, and in this respect the Thais seemed to anticipate the end well before the
Americans. 
Accepting this fact, Thai foreign policy exercised its traditional flexibility. Surviving in
the post-Vietnam war era became the priority, and this meant accommodating
communism.122 As early as 1966 Thanat Khoman anticipated US disengagement from
the region, testing the winds with Hanoi and Beijing by arguing that Thailand was "not
necessarily anti-communist, nor for that matter anti-Chinese, anti-Russian, anti-North
Korean or anti-North Vietnamese."123 Shortly after Lyndon Johnson's decision not to run
in the 1968 presidential election, Thanat said that "Thailand should not be blamed if we
were to seek an accommodation with Communist China." At a Tokyo press conference in
February 1969, the foreign minister stunned the audience when he announced "[T]o show
that Thailand is not anti-communist and anti-Chinese we are prepared to sit down and
talk -- and have meaningful discussion -- with Peking to establish peaceful coexistence."
Just a few days later, Thanat suggested that he was willing to meet Chinese
representatives to "help draw China out of her isolation so that she could become a
member of the Asian family."124 The old sage of Thai politics (and twice prime minister
of Thailand), Seni Pramoj, was even more succinct, warning Thais that "we have let the
US forces use our country to bomb Hanoi. When the Americans go away, they won't take
that little bit of history with them."125 
CONCLUSION
Although Thailand continued to play an important role assisting US policy in Indochina,
by 1969 the end was definitely clear. In August, President Richard Nixon went to
Thailand to discuss the war in Vietnam. Nixon did not consider Thailand nearly as
important as any of his predecessors, but he still needed Thai support for American
military operations in the region. Much to Washington's surprise, the Thai government
seized the occasion to launch a diplomatic first-strike. Thanom announced that Thailand
would end its participation in clandestine operations with the US, and he asked the
president to disengage American troops from Thailand. The communist insurgency in the
Northeast was, Thanom pointed out, under control, and he warned that the large
American military presence did more harm than good by encouraging Hanoi and Beijing
to continue their support of insurgents. 
Nixon managed an honorable withdrawal of the nearly 48,000 US troops from Thailand
beginning in September 1969. However, the use of Thai air bases, as well as covert and
counter-insurgency operations, continued in gradual decline for six more years until 1975.
Throughout this period relations with the United States were centre stage in Thai politics.
In 1971, public disclosure that Bangkok was conducting secret talks with Hanoi
stimulated divisions within the government over the direction of Thai foreign policy.
After a bloodless internal coup that November, an even more authoritarian regime was
reconstituted by Thanom. However, the success of the Nixon administration's
rapprochement with Beijing in 1972, and official peace talks with Hanoi the following
year effectively undermined Thanom's credibility. Unable to accommodate either
development, Thanom was in the unusual position of being more committed to a military
solution in Indochina than the US president. A groundswell of public support for
domestic reform and foreign policy change in Thailand culminated in the fall of 1973,
when protests against the Thanom regime turned violent. Only after intervention by the
revered King Bhumipol was a major conflict averted. The Thai military supported the
king, and many top government officials, including Thanom himself, fled the country.126
Military rule in Thailand was by no means ended, but the events of 1973 demonstrated
the desire for greater democratic reform and changes to the long relationship with the
US.127 
Despite communist victories in Indochina by 1975, Thailand was no domino. Even with
the withdrawal of US military power from the region, and although surrounded by hostile
neighbors, Thailand emerged as a relatively stable economic and political power in
Southeast Asia. Without question this development owed much to the American security
umbrella, but the presence of US forces in Thailand throughout the 1960s and early 1970s
does not provide the only explanation.128 While there was an indigenous communist
insurgency in the Northeast, it was never a serious threat to Thailand's stability. Thais did
not experience the emotional, divisive, and convulsive nationalism of their neighbors, but
instead enjoyed a comparative unity, reinforced by their ancient reverence for the
monarchy and the Buddhist faith. With the departure of the American military from
Indochina by the mid 1970s, traditional flexibility in Thai foreign policy managed to help
accommodate the external communist threat, while at the same time maintaining fairly
solid relations with Washington. 
In many ways Thailand was a success story for American policy, amidst a sea of failures
in Southeast Asia. The United States clearly failed to "save" Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia
from communism, but did succeed in helping Thailand. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
and Burma also successfully resisted communist insurgencies with direct and/or indirect
assistance from the United States. The price in all of these countries was high. Military
dictatorships and autocracies ruled for decades with the full collusion of successive
presidential administrations in Washington. This, of course, was a pattern that developed
in many parts of the world during the Cold War. In many respects it was the collateral of
containment theory. In Thailand democratic reforms were encouraged throughout the long
relationship with the United States, but few took quick root. American policy in
Southeast Asia was for more than 20 years fixated on combating communism.
Democracy took a back seat. In this respect the United States perpetuated
authoritarianism, and delayed the onset of political reform. 
However, perhaps ironically, the United States can claim victory on this point too. The
economic prosperity that such a long and extensive US military presence in Thailand
brought ultimately gave rise to a more developed political consciousness. By the 1970s
this consciousness manifested as Thai nationalism, which was framed in part by anti-
Americanism against the backdrop of communist advances in Indochina. This ultimately
displaced military rule in Bangkok, and led to a more balanced and multilateral foreign
policy. Thailand remained at the centre of regional security and development through
organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With a more
established economic infrastructure, again courtesy of American assistance, Thailand
enjoyed continued prosperity in the 1980s as one of the "new dragons" of Asia. Political
reforms followed, and although Thailand's journey is by no means finished, the country
has embarked on a new chapter in its democratization. 
Thailand risked a great deal by assisting the United States in its fight against communism
in Southeast Asia. In addition to military authoritarianism, many Thais lamented the
negative cultural consequences of such a large American presence in their country.
Increased prostitution, the expanded drug trade, and the erosion of traditional Thai values
have all been blamed on the US military during its stay. However, Thailand also
benefitted considerably and ultimately survived the Cold War far better than many of its
neighbors. Similarly, the United States benefitted from its involvement with Thailand too.
Without Thailand the United States would have had an even more difficult experience in
Indochina. The financial costs, particularly for bombing missions, would have been far
higher. Politically, Washington's claim to be fighting on behalf of its Asian allies would
have been severely undermined. Militarily, the prosecution of both overt and covert
operations would have been dramatically complicated. Without Thailand's support the
ways and means of American involvement in Indochina would have been entirely
different, and the raison d'etre even more doubtful. In this respect, from covert operative
to post-war ally, Thailand was critically important to the United States; a not so silent
partner in the shadow of Vietnam. 
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